Abstract
Introduction
All The term Malicious Code (MC) refers to threats posed from code execution that cause damage or render the system security useless. MC can be categorized into virus, worm, logic bomb, trojan horse, germ, exploit, downloader, dialer, dropper, injector, auto-rooter, virus generator spammer program, flooder, key logger, rootkit and spyware [15, 4] .
In this paper, we present a novel architecture for an effective defense against malicious code attack called MaCDI. The next section presents the current evolving threats, as a research motivation. Section three provides brief explanations to problems in the existing solutions. Section four explores the Human Immune System (HIS) that is gaining its momentum since several years ago. Section five describes our architecture in depth. Before the conclusion, we outline several case studies on how our idea could fit to a number of situations.
The Evolving Threat
All Malicious code has gone through a number of stages [4] as computers have evolved, from exploiting sector 0 of floppy disks to spreading through email contacts in attached files. Malware is also embedded into executable files, some of them targeting files in shared directories. Macro viruses target word processing software, which people use to work with their documents. The distribution of these documents has simultaneously triggered the spread of the viruses. Email also became a medium of propagation with infected files sent as attachments to other machines. Dubious and legitimate but hacked websites become the target for malware distribution via the installation of plug-ins or java applets. Embedded malicious code also exists in free-to-download files such as system utilities and screensavers.
CD and DVD disks can execute programs automatically upon insertion of the disk. When a CD-ROM drive's autorun property is set to enable, an inserted CD/DVD containing malicious content can cause a computer to be fully compromised. USB is a popular medium for personal file transfer and backup because it is small, reliable and handy. A modified USB with U3 technology makes one part of the USB being detected as a CD-ROM. Some modifications will allow full customization on what application will execute upon insertion of the USB into a USB port [1] . Worm propagation does not require user interaction. Malicious code can directly target hosts, while others target software vulnerability. A vulnerable machine also faces arbitrary code injection using exploits.
There have been a number of disastrous malware attacks, such as Code Red, Code Red II, Melissa, Witty, Nachi, Santy, SQL.Slammer and MyDoom [4] . These threats demand faster detection of unknown attacks and an ability to immunize computers affected by the first wave of attacks.
Present Solutions To The Problems
Many researchers have attempted solutions such as checksum, heuristic, integrity shell, string checker, system call tracing, machine emulators, logic analyzers and network sniffers [4, 10] . The checksum technique uses a mathematical algorithm to extract a digital signature from the file contents. If the file contents changes, there is a very high probability that the checksum will no longer match. However, it only provides change detection and is not feasible for frequently updated files. The heuristic is an approach that analyzes based on a rule of thumb, and although popular, is susceptible to code obfuscation and direct attacks. The integrity shell method checks for alteration evidence. This technique is only suitable for managing read-only files such as application's DLLs. The string checker method reads binary data in files, looking for known signatures. This technique assumes that malicious code always shares the same or similar binary patterns, since most viruses use a limited number of attack techniques. Unfortunately, this technique is vulnerable to viruses presenting with a new binary pattern. It is also slow and only able to detect known signatures. Thus, frequent signature update is required. A machine emulator is suitable for tracing the effect of a suspicious program. At the end of the execution, files are compared with their state before the execution takes place. However this technique requires traversing and checking every single path code. A logic analyzer captures every single instruction of a traced process. This information may help to identify harmful instructions. Using a network sniffer, also known as protocol analyzer or packet sniffer, is a technique to defend computer network against several kind of attacks. For instance, it could be possible when some attacks generate similar traffic pattern over time or matches the existing attack signatures. However, a slight modification could change the attack pattern. Encrypted packet payload is also difficult to reveal.
The software certification is a solution for Microsoft applications and third party vendor applications [9] . However, this technique is not feasible in terms of cost, especially for small organizations or non-profit organizations, because not all software houses or programmers can afford to bear the cost.
Alternatively, hardening the operating system (OS) code can avoid malicious exploitation of system files and resources. Disabling executable and scripting will ensure no MC can run. However, this solution is largely infeasible, as applications will have fewer capabilities available to them. Furthermore, many legacy applications will fail to run with a significantly disabled Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) on the OS.
There are a number of other popular implementations for malware detection. Automatic patch generation architecture [14] counters worm attacks by using a number of sensors to capture potential attack vectors. Suspicious vectors are tested against instrumented applications in a sandbox environment and vulnerability exploits are identified. Using a heuristic technique, the best patch is updated to the actual server. This architecture is susceptible to attacks that cause unnecessary patch generations.
Sandboxed environments [8] isolate code execution in an isolated area. This technique requires application customization to allow it to be sandboxed. Virtual machines are a form of sandboxed systems. The problem of using this is at least two OSs need to run. Furthermore, it is infeasible to determine which code caused a virus, as time-delayed viruses could wait until a later date to deliver their destructive payload.
Real-time analysis can be used to detect worms [12] , where packet payload is read to look for repetitive packet patterns. It is assumed that Internet worms tend to send the same packet repetitively to the same host. This technique however is susceptible to customized attacks that hide the patterns, and is also only applicable to worms.
System call tracing or API hooking is a technique that looks for the use of APIs, trapping calls invoked by each application. Forrest et al. [6] fragmented long system calls into several shorter system calls signature. We follow this approach and refine the signatures so that signatures, which are not harmful, can be removed, thus reducing the size of our malware profile. Yangfang et al. [16] recorded all system calls attempts and generated system calls signature to contains detailed information about the process which also include the total number of called functions made by the process. In [9] they monitored several potential APIs used by malicious code such as registry, file system, scripting host, system and communication APIs. Changes made by programs are tracked and recorded, to be undone should malicious API calls be detected.
Human Immune System
The mechanisms of the Human Immune System (HIS) have inspired many researchers to adapt similar characteristics in computer defense [2] . A newborn baby does not have a developed immunity, but depends on the thymus that carries inherited immunity from the mother.
In HIS, B cells are white blood cells that play a large role in the humoral immune response whereas Tcells have roles in the cell-mediated immune response, also known as innate immune system. The major task performed by B cells is to make antibodies.
A variety of T-cells, Natural Killer (NK) cells, recognize a pathogen when the cell's Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC) shown on its surface is detected as non-self. Damaged or infected cells tend show unusual level of MHC.
Forrest et al. [6] adapted this idea for their self-nonself theory. Benign cells may show low volume of MHC due to reasons such as the cells is too old or damaged. NK bring these cells to lysis (repair) or apoptosis (dismantle for complete safe destruction).
NK cells are cell killers, activated when they receive one of the following signals:
• Cytokines: A stressed cell may release uric acid to inhibit a pathogen that is entering through its cell wall. NK cells detect this acid and respond against pathogen situated at the surrounding area of the cell. Matzinger's Danger Theory [13] adapted this process.
• FC-Receptor: At site the of infection, a large number of white cells engulfs pathogens and repairs infected cells.
• Activating and inhibitory receptors: NK has receptors that connect to nearby cells. These receptors regulate cells destruction activities. The defense of HIS inspired many researchers to adapt similar characteristics in computer security. There are several models of self and non-self [3] . Pioneering works by Forrest et al. [6, 5] used the nature of the peptides to allow the differentiation between self and non-self. The input vector is analogous to the peptide. Using the negative selection algorithm, there are two stages involved: generation stage and detection stage. In the generation stage, a normal profile is recorded with the assumption that there are no intrusive activities. Once the normal profile is sufficiently developed, a raw vector is passed to a process with the aim to match the self-sample. A matching self-sample (normal vector) will be discarded and the remaining vectors (abnormal) will be passed to a detector. In the detection stage, the detector uses recorded attack vectors to compare with the incoming vectors. Any matching pattern is considered anomalous.
There are a number of other research studies including [11, 7] which attempted to explore the mapping ideas between malicious code detection and Danger Theory. In [11] , the authors adopted the 
In their work, the PAMP can be assumed as security policy violation. Safe Signal is the same as normal behavior. The danger signal is equivalent to a harmful symptom such as a sharp spike in memory or CPU processes. Cytokine is equivalent to the system load average that can change as a result of one or more symptoms. Antigen is regarded as exploited system calls.
System architecture
Our proposed malicious code detection solution encompasses the human immune system. We are interested in pattern recognition using vectors derived from system calls rather than from the code signature itself, as suggested by Forrest et al. [6, 5] . Figure 1 illustrates general components in our proposed solution. Demonstrating the feature of the thymus that provides immunity for a newborn baby, we create a malware profile of the actions of existing viruses. This is created by running as many existing viruses as possible within a test bed to collect API call patterns. Refinement of the profile is crucial so as to reduce the profile size and the profile matching overhead. Thus a collection of common user applications on a specific platform are then executed to filter out non-malware API calls patterns. The result is a malware profile of common API calls sequences used primarily in MC.
Our proposed detection model consists of two phases: the Adolescent Phase and the Mature Phase, corresponding to the innate and acquired immune response, respectively. Each program must separately and independently partake in these two phases.
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Figure 2. Processes in adolescent phase
Every newly installed program enters the Adolescent Phase (see Figure 2) . In this phase all system calls that it invokes are monitored and compared with the malware profile. If a call matches a number of patterns, execution will be terminated and the executable code will be quarantined. The quarantined executable's API call patterns can further be analyzed to update the malware profile, however this research is beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, the binary code signature of the MC is recorded. In a step similar to current anti-virus programs, the Scanner is activated to perform a cleanup operation at the next scan interval. The signature obtained from the matched executable is used by the signature-based Scanner to scan for the same files in related directories. Files that are found will be quarantined. This allows further removal of the same MC before it is executed. This process is analogous to the adaptive immune system If, on the other hand, there is no match between the new running program and the malware profile, a program profile will be built. A program profile is a smaller profile than the larger malware profile of all malicious code call patterns. A program profile is simply the usual API pattern calls for a given application after a significant amount of usage time and usage spread of the executable code base. The program will move from Adolescent Phase to Mature Phase when its program profile becomes mature, which depends on the following rules:
• The amount of time the program has been running cumulatively.
• The spread of an application's code which has been executed. Naturally not all code within an application will ever run, but the more code which is run the greater the size variable.
• The number of failed attempts to add a new system call pattern exceeds a threshold. This means that harvesting a new pattern is already too exhaustive. Once an application has entered the Mature Phase, MaCDI no longer performs API comparing with the full malware profile nor does the program profile get updated. Consider this analogy: a person meets new people each day. As that person forms a longer relationship, and the spread of situations that the two are involved in increases (i.e. the more aspects of the other's life a person witnesses), the more a person is trusted.Once a person is trusted, they are in the Mature Phase. Less checking is done on them and more trust is placed on them to execute potentially dangerous actions (such as giving them a spare key to a house, etc). If the person starts behaving differently from expected, then more awareness is placed on them and they become less trusted again. Naturally, someone trusted could still do person harm to a person, and the same applies to applications, which are in the Mature Phase. All that can be done in this case is to roll back damaged files where possible and manually repair other damage (such as MC utilizing an email address list to propagate the viral payload to others).
There would be cases where a legitimate program installed by a user is deemed as malicious, where the software vendor even declares that their software product has malware behaviors. Such programs are often related to hacking and penetration tools. The end user may manually put a program into the Mature Phase at their own risk.
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Figure 3. Processes in mature phase
Any program that survives the Adolescent Phase is expected to enter the Mature Phase eventually (provided the application is continually used, and not a run-once case). In this phase (see Figure 3) , the program will undergo system call checking every time it is run. The system calls it makes are considered anomalous when an invocation pattern deviates from the pattern stored in the program profile, at which point it drops back to the Adolescent Phase and the newly executed code runs through the full malware profile again.
The occurrence of the deviation can be assumed as the appearance of the uric acid on stressed cells. This process conforms to the process of NK cells recognizing a pathogen when the cell's fragmented peptides shown on its surface are detected as non-self. If in the Adolescent Phase the executable detected as malware, it will be quarantined. The Scanner is activated to perform a clean up operation at the next scan interval. If it is not a malware activity, the Profile Builder will add the pattern into its existing program profile.
Changes and deletion on files are logged. A file deletion will cause the file to be backed up first. If the delete operation is not part of a malware pattern, the backup copy is also deleted otherwise the file is restored. We propose the use of a versioning file system as an underlying format for disks. A versioning file system uses a copy-on-write approach to file modification. It stores the original content of files for a certain period so that unwanted changes can be rolled back. Newer operating systems today offer such similar technology (Shadow Copy is available in all releases of Microsoft Windows since Windows XP SP1. Mac OS X Leopard has Time Machine), which makes rollback after MC has executed trivial.
Performing backup can also slow down computer performance. We prioritize backup of those files into three lists where lower rank files may not be backed up if computer performance is downgraded. They are: User Files (Top Critical): This list contains files created by the user using any application. Losing these files causes loss of intellectual property, as they cannot be replaced, unless other copies exist. In our analogy of the human body, this corresponds to the loss of a person's mind. OS Files (Medium Critical): These files are essential to the operation of the computer. If the damage cannot be repaired, the OS and applications need to be reinstalled. This is analogous to critical cells in the human body, such as brain, stem cells etc., where damage may cause death or catastrophic illness. Application Files (Low Critical): This list contains applications that are installed or stored in the computer. Losing these files interferes with the application functionality, but not with the OS. These are analogous to the cells that form muscle, skin, bone etc. Damage to these cells may cause permanent disability to the affected.
MaCDI is a generic model for platform-independent computer defense against malicious code attack. We suggest that a detected malicious behavior of an executable will cause it be quarantined. There are also some executables used to run some executables and script files. MaCDI monitors executables and also identifies the script file that is executed. A detected malicious activity on the executable will cause the script file to be quarantined.
From Theory to Case Study
A program that performs malicious activities can be detected as early as its first run in the Adolescent Phase, when system calls made are compared with malware profile. Some programs may start showing its dangerous behavior at a certain point of time. It is unusual for a normal program to have malign features such as key logging, downloading executables and mass mailing unless it is installed for that purpose. The detection occurs at the time the malicious pattern starts. Some programs may start showing their malicious behavior in the second phase. The executable program will be quarantined, and any affected files will be restored to their original condition. The Scanner extracts a code signature from the file and uses it to scan the related directories of the program at the next scan interval. Files associated with the program will be marked for quarantine. If the program does not match malicious activities during running, its API call patterns will be updated in the program profile.
A matured program is allowed to perform the API call sequences, which have been recorded in its program profile. If the mature program then begins performing API call sequences which are outside its usual pattern, further API calls will be checked against the complete malware profile. If, perchance, modifying files has been recorded and allowed in the program profile (e.g. a word processor saves files which it first loads), then this action will be undetected and only human action can flag a potential virus. Whether or not malicious code can be constructed to not deviate from a program profile and the amount of information stored in the program profile is a subject of impending work.
Challenges and Conclusion
There are vast resources in the Internet open for malicious code writers to take advantage of any opportunities to craft their new malware. When new malware is created, as long it has the behavior as already known in the malware profile, the malware execution would be detected.
In this paper, we introduce our novel architecture for an effective solution against malicious code attack. Inspired by HIS, MaCDI proposes to detect malware even though the malware has not been detected earlier, by looking at similar patterns to system calls. The challenges of our architecture are: 1. The ability to learn and anticipate the next completely new malware behavior that lies beyond detection of MaCDI. Profiling the first variant of a next generation malware possibly overcomes the problem. 2. Minimizing the impact on the computer performance while hooking up the OS files to obtain as many relevant system calls as possible. Unhooking selected API on OS processes could be the solution as we assume those processes are clean until desirable performance is achieved. However, the assumption can be wrong when using pirated copy or modified installer. Together with an optimized classifier, the reduction of malware profile and program profile can also enhance MaCDI performance. 3. Minimizing the impact on the computer performance while backing up files. To overcome that we could also prioritize files that need back up.
In future work, we will model and test the classifier to be used for obtaining matches between the profiles and the executable. At the end of our experiment we will attempt to answer the following questions: 1. Can system calls signature detect more viruses than binary code signatures? 2. Are system calls signatures smaller than binary code signatures? 3. Does combining both system calls and code signatures result in better detection (i.e. more viruses detected)? 4. Are fragments of system calls signature better for detecting viruses than using the whole signature? What fragment length works best? 5. Are there viruses we cannot get system calls signature for? 6. Can a virus creator (hacker) find a way around the system calls based detector?
